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THE DISCOVERY RULE AND FATHER-
DAUGHTER INCEST: A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Father-daughter incest is a major problem in our society.' Some experts estimate
that as many as one in every hundred women were sexually abused as children, by a
family member.2 Incestuous abuse often causes long-term psychological damage to the
survivor, 3 which may not manifest itself 'until many years after the abuse ceases.4 The
incest victim also faces extreme pressures from society, her family and from the abuser
himself, not to disclose the abuse. 5 Thus; an incest survivor commonly does not seek a
civil remedy until years, after the incestuous relationship has ended. 6
Criminal sanctions for incest, designed to punish offenders, have failed to protect
the child-victim.' Children often do not reveal the abuse, and if they do, a criminal trial
Father-daughter incest is the most frequently reported incestuous relationship, and experts
believe it has many more negative implications for the child than other incestuous relationships. J.
HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 18 (1981), Incest also occurs between family members other
than fathers and daughters. Id. at 29. In fact; "[s]orne authorities believe that brother-sister incest
is more common than any other kind but that less of it gets reported or detected since it is considered
less serious and may be handled within the family," B. JusricE & R. JUSTICE, THE BROKEN TABOO:
SEX IN THE FAMILY 61 (1979). This note does not consider the problem of sexual abuse between
family members, other than fathers and daughters.
Throughout this note, the terms "incest" and "incestuous abuse" will be used interchangeably.
HERMAN, supra note I, at 12-14. This figure was derived from the results of five major studies
conducted by Alfred Kinsey in 1953 with over 4,000 women; John Gagnon in 1965 with over 1,200
women from Kinsey's group; Judson Landis in 1956 and David Finkelhor in 1978 with over 2,000
women; and Carney Landis in 1940 with 295 women. Id. at 12.
These surveys produced consistent outcomes. One fifth to one third of all women recounted a
childhood sexual encounter with an adult male. Id. Between four and twelve percent of all adult
women reported a sexual incident with a relative. Id. One adult woman in one hundred disclosed
a sexual experience with her father or stepfather. Id.
These studies were conducted predominately with white middle-class women. Id. at 14. Because
poor women are the most frequent victims of violence and abuse within the general population,
these estimates are probably low. Id. Additionally, estimates are certainly low because many factors
combine to prevent the victim from reporting the incestuous assault. See infra notes 59-65 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these factors. But see K. MEISELMAN, INCEST 207 (1978) (citing
Henderson, Incest, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXi'llOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1537 (2d ed. 1975) (estimating
the frequency of incest at one in one million)).
3 The term ''survivor" means the adult victim of childhood incestuous abuse. See, e.g. HERMAN,
supra note 1. Survivor describes the incest-victim at a time in her life when she has confronted the
childhood sexual experiences, and links her trauma with the offender's conduct. Tyson v. Tyson,
107 Wash. 2d 72, 89, 727 P.2d 226, 235 (1986) (Pearson, J., dissenting). See infra notes 66-78 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the negative psychological effects of childhood incestuous
abuse.
4 Gelinas, The Persisting Negative Effects of Incest, 46 PSYCHIATRY 312, 315 (1983). See infra notes
79-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons for delayed emergence of incest-
related injuries.
5 HERMAN, supra note I, at 88. See also infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text for a discussion
Of the pressures that influence the child incest-victim not to disclose the abuse.
6 See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons victims do not
disclose the abusive relationship or seek a civil remedy.
7 See infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of incest and the criminal
justice system.
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may be as traumatic as the abuse itself. 8 Consequently, few incest victims will testify at
trial and offenders are very rarely prosecuted or punished.9 Because existing criminal
remedies are inadequate, tort remedies should provide the needed supplement to crim-
inal sanctions in order to fully vindicate the incest victim's rights." In particular, the
sexual assault victim is entitled to monetary compensation for her injuries, including
damages for subsequent medical and psychological treatment." At present, however,
procedural and substantive obstacles preclude traditional tort actions for incestuous
assault. 12
Procedurally, the major obstacle to an adult incest survivor's damages claim is that
the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault often expires before injuries become
evident." Under traditional tort theory, the intentional tort victim's cause of action
accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, when the wrongdoer completes the
tortious act." Because it is an intentional tort, incestuous abuse claims accrue, and the
limitations period begins to run, at,the time the abuse occurs." Consequently, tort claims
for incest-related injuries that do not surface until many years after the abusive rela-
tionship terminates, are often time-barred."
Courts have developed a device known as the "discovery rule," in order to mitigate
the harsh results that occur upon the mechanical application of statutes of limitation to
civil actions." Specifically, the discovery rule delays a cause of action's accrual where the
plaintiff did not and reasonably could not have known about the injury." In such cases,
8 Owen, Introduction: Child Abuse and the Law: A Special Issue, BOSTON BAR J. 4, 4 (Mar./Apr.
1986).
9 HERMAN, supra note 1, at 163. See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text for a discussion
of how the criminal justice system treats incestuous abuse claims.
1 ° See infra notes 197-99 for a discussion of the need for tort remedies to supplement criminal
sanctions in order to vindicate the incest victim's rights.
" See infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the negative psychological
effects of incest.
12 Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S
LT 189, 189-90 (1984).
Historically, parent-child immunity,' has shielded the parent from liability for injuries sustained
by the child, even in the case of intentional torts. See Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788
(1905) (demurrer sustained to daughter's complaint against father for money damages, following
his conviction and imprisonment for her rape). The Roller court stated that "the maintenance of
harmonious and proper family relations is conducive to good citizenship, and therefore works to
the welfare of the state." Id. at 244, 79 P. at 788. Acknowledging that in this instance family relations
had already been disturbed beyond repair, the court nonetheless asserted that the "domestic
relations of the home and Family fireside cannot be disturbed by the members thereof by litigation
prosecuted against each other for injuries, real or imaginary, arising out of these relations . ." Id.
In most states, the trend is toward the:abrogation of parent-child immunity. See generally Walker,
Till Torts Do Us Part, 7 FAM. Anvoc. 4 (Spring 1985).
See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the delayed emergence of
incest-related harm.
14 See generally, Developments in the Law — Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1200-
01 (1950). See generally notes 105-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of tolling statutes of
limitations.
15 See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of statutes of limitation's
application to intentional torts.
16 See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the delayed emergence of
incest-related harm.
17 See infra notes 93-97 for a discussion of how statutes of limitation operate to bar stale claims.
18 See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the discovery rule.
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the cause of action accrues, and the statutory period begins to run, when the plaintiff
knew or reasonably should have known of the harm.°
Courts apply the discovery rule almost exclusively to negligent, and not to inten-
tional, tort claims because in most intentional torts the wrongful conduct and the re-
sulting harm occur siniultaneously. 2° Courts hesitate to apply the discovery rule to
intentional torts even where the victim was blamelessly ignorant of his or her injuries,
for fear that the exceptions to statutes of limitation would swallow the rule, leaving
potential defendants forever at risk. Because legislatures classify childhood sexual assault
as an intentional tort, courts generally do not apply the discovery rule to toll the
limitations period. 21 Therefore, until legislatures recognize incestuous abuse as a unique
tort and apply an appropriate statute of limitations in such cases, most civil incest claims
will be barred forever. 22
To prevent the discovery rule from nullifying statutes of limitations, courts should
not extend the rule to intentional torts. Rather, legislatures should extend the limitations
period for incestuous abuse claims statutorily. A legislative response is appropriate
because it would limit the discovery rule's expansion. Moreover, because incest is such a
damaging and widespread social probleM, a statutorily extended limitations period would
ensure that more claims will be heard, more survivors compensated, and a more effective
deterrence created.
Some state legislatures already have responded to the need for statutory reform.
For example, in 1986, California and Massachusetts enacted statutes extending the
statute of limitations for incestuous abuse, in the civil and criminal contexts, respec-
tively. 23 Similarly, the 1987 Massachusetts Legislature considered a bill to extend the
statute of limitations for civil incest actions. 24 Although these bills are a step in the right
direction, neither the California statute nor the Massachusetts bill is adequate. Neither
precisely defines incest or psychological injury, applies a statute of limitations that bal-
ances the rights of the victim against the rights of potential defendants, and precludes
judicial application of the discovery rule. 25 A model civil incest act, in contrast, balances
the plaintiff's rights of privacy and emotional health against the defendant's right to the
claim's timely presentation. 26 This law should ensure that the incest-victim's action is not
time-barred before injuries are apparent. In addition, the statute should define explicitly
incest-related emotional injury in order to protect the defendant from false allegations
that are difficult to disprove.
19 Cf. Fischer, The Limits of Statutes of Limitation, 16 Sw. U.L, REV. 1, 5 (1986). See also infra notes
101-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of the discovery rule's purpose.
29 See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text for a comparative analysis of' the discovery
rule's application to negligent torts and intentional torts.
2 ' See, e.g., Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986); Raymond v. Ingrain, 47
Wash. App. 781, 737 P.2d 314 (1987); Smith v. Smith, No. CIV-85-285E (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1986)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
22 Some state legislatures have recognized incestuous abuse as a specific tort and applied a
statute of limitations different than that for other intentional torts. See, e.g. CAL. C1V. PROC. CODE
§ 340.1 (West Supp. 1988).
22 See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the California and Mas-
sachusetts statutes.
24 S. 722, 175 Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Mass.; H.R. 5745, 175 Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Mass.
" See infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text for a discussion or a Model Civil Incest Act.
25 See infra note 253 and accompanying text for a proposed Model Civil Incest Act.
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This note analyzes the nature of incestuous abuse claims and the impact of statutes
of limitation on these claims. In particular, section I discusses the incestuous abuse
problem." Section II then examines the purposes underlying statutes of limitation,"
including the justifications for tolling the statutory period," the discovery rule," and the
rule's application in both intentional and negligent tort actions. 3 ' Section III considers
the impact of statutes of limitation on civil incest suits" and the current legislative
response to the incestuous abuse problem." Section IV analyzes the need for civil
remedies for incest" and examines the strict application of statutes of limitations to civil
incest suits in light of the delayed emergence of incest-related harm." Finally, this note
concludes that because statutes of limitation render civil remedies ineffective, legislatures
must extend statutorily the limitations period for incest claims." To this end, this note
proposes a Model Civil Incest Act, which recognizes that the incestuous abuse claim is
unique and balances the plaintiff's right to sue against the defendant's right to timely
presentation of claims." •
I. THE PROBLEM OF INCEST
Incestuous abuse particularly that which occurs between fathers and daughters
is a pervasive and serious problem in the United States." Suspected underreport-
27 See infra notes 38-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the historic treatment of
incest.
28 See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy and purposes
underlying statutes of limitation.
28
 See infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of justifications for tolling
statutes of limitation.
See infra notes 106-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the discovery rule.
Sec infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text for a comparative application of the discovery
rule to intentional and negligent torts.
32 See infra notes 142-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of statutes of limitation's
application to civil incest.
"See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the current legislative
response to the incest problem.
3' See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text for an analysis of the need for civil incest
remedies.
33 See infra notes 200-27 and accompanying text for an analysis of the need for civil remedies.
36 See infra notes 228-48 and accompanying text for an analysis of current legislative enact-
ments.
" See infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text for a proposed Model Civil Incest Act.
38
 For the purposes of this note, the term "incest" is defined as any sexual contact "between a
child and an adult in a position of parental authority." HERMAN, supra note 1, at 70. This includes
"any physical contact that had to be kept a secret ....Mhe sexual motivation of the contact, and
the fact that it must he kept secret, are far more significant Ito the child] than the exact nature of
the act itself." Id. Thus, incest is defined as not only sexual intercourse, but also any activity which
sexually stimulates a child or uses a child for the sexual stimulation of others. jusTicE, supra note
1, at 27. See also SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 58 (P. Mrazek & C. H. Kenipe
ed. 1981). Furthermore, "tilt is important to emphasize that incest is relationally-based sexual abuse
.... Incest takes place within the context that is supposed to nurture, protect and care for the child
... and upon which she is utterly dependent. Incest is a profound abandonment and betrayal ...."
GELINAS, supra note 4, at 319.
This psychological definition of incest is broader than the statutory definitions, which are
designed to prohibit sexual intercourse and marriage between family members. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 255.25 (McKinney Supp. 1988). For example, the New York incest statute states in pertinent
part:
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ing,39 combined with the lack of a uniform incest clefinition, 4u makes it difficult to measure
accurately the problem's precise scope.'" For example, estimates of the incidence of
father-daughter sexual contact range from one daughter in one hundred to one in one
million.42
More cases of incest are now being reported than in the past." States have enacted
more effective child abuse reporting legislation, and the statistics show a 50 to 500
percent annual increase in confirmed cases of incestuous abuse, on both the metropolitan
and state levels:" It is impossible to determine, however, whether the increased reports
of childhood sexual assault reflect an actual escalation in its occurrence or a greater
willingness among incest victims and families to report incestuous abuse.15
The increase in substantiated incestuous abuse reports also may be credited to
society's growing willingness to believe the victim. Because society has long viewed father-
daughter incest as morally repugnant, investigators historically were reluctant to admit
that it was as prevalent as most reports seemed to indicate. 46 Even Sigmund Freud, whose
initial studies indicated that incest was a common source of later neurosis, 41 repudiated
his claims and theorized that patients fantasized "sexual seduction." 45 Experts often relied
on Freud's conclusion that victims fantasized sexual trauma to discount incest reports. 4°
Current research, however, suggests that professionals should reconsider Freud's clas-
sification of incest reports as fantasies.."
A person is guilty of incest when he or she marries or engages iii sexual intercourse
or deviant sexual intercourse with a person whom he or she knows to be related to
him or her, either legitimately or out of wedlock, as an ancestor, descendant, brother
- or sister of either the whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece,
Id. See generally Bienan, The Incest Statutes, in HERMAN, supra note I, at 221.
" See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors involved in
underreporting.
4° See supra note 38 for various definitions of incest.
41 The "study of incest behavior necessarily involves the use of skewed, nonrepresentative
samples, since the most feasible approach to obtaining a sample is to work under the auspices of a
legal, social, or clinical agency that frequently encounters cases of incest in the population it serves."
MEISELMAN, supra note 2, at 32. Thus, it will always be difficult to get an accurate estimate of the
occurrence of incestuous abuse. Id.
42 See supra note 2 for statistics concerning the incidence of father-daughter incest.
" JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 15.
44 Id, In recent years, the problem of childhood sexual abuse has been championed by both the
women's and children's movements, groups experienced in publicizing social problems. D. FINKEL-
HOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 3 (1984). This increased publicity . has contributed to the increased public
awareness of the incest problem, and resulted in increased reporting. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 18.
45 JusTicE., supra note 1, at 15.
w HERMAN, supra note 1, at 7.
47 Cf. 3 S. FREUD, THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OP SIGMUND FREUD 207-08 (1962).
See also generally 21 BREUR & S. FREUD, THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS Or SIGMUND FREUD
133-34.
• ill See S. FREUD, THE ORIGINS Or PSYCHOANALYSIS 215-16 (1954). Freud stated that "[Ilben
there was the astonishing thing that in every case ... blame was laid on perverse acts by the father,
and realization of the unexpected frequency of hysteria, in every case of which the same thing
applied, though it was hardly credible that perverted acts -against children were so general." Id,
MEISELMAN, supra note 2, at 37. See also GOODWIN, SAND & RADA, False Accusations and False
Denials of Incest: Clinical Myths and Clinical Realities, in SEXUAL ABUSE. — INCEST VICTIMS AND THEIR
FAMILIES 18 ( J. Goodwin ed. 1982) [hereinafter Goonwm].
50 MEISELMAN, supra note 2 at 37 (citing Berry, Incest: Some Clinical Variations on a Classical Theme,
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Following Freud's lead, the legal system failed also to recognize the scope of the
incest problem. 51 In his influential Treatise on Evidence, John Henry Wigmore asserted
that women's, especially children's, complaints of sexual assault were of dubious credi-
bility." He therefore suggested that sexual assault accusations frequently originate en-
tirely in the accuser's mind, with no basis in fact."
In contrast to Freud and Wigmore, modern experts conclude that children rarely
make false incest accusations. 54 In fact, false retractions of' valid claims are more common
than false accusations of' incest. 55
 Generally, retractions occur where the child becomes
frightened by the impact of her disclosure on the family and recants her story," or
refuses to talk about the incest or to testify." Statistical data on incest hoaxes include
these false retractions, which inflate the perception that children invent incest stories. 58
Notwithstanding society's increased awareness of incestuous abuse and a greater
willingness to believe the child who reports abuse, many cases still remain undisclosed."
Once an incestuous incident occurs," the abusive relationship can continue only if the
victim keeps the father's secret. 83 Given the imbalance of power, resources, and knowl-
edge, the child generally agrees to secrecy." Furthermore, many abusers threaten the
children with severe harm if they break the silence." Thus, although the victim knows
3 J. Am. ACAD. PSYCHOANALYSIS 151 (1975); Peters, Children Who Are Victims of Sexual Assault and
the Psychology of Offenders, 30 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 398 (1976)).
" See e.g., Wilson v. United States, 271 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1959); People v. Willmore, 24 III.
App. 3d 291, 320 N.E.2d 333 (1974).
52 I I IA WICMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 924a, at 736-47 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). See generally
HERMAN, supra note 1, at II.
"Id. See also Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ("[Olur courts have
traditionally been unusually skeptical toward the accusation .... This has been true of all the so-
called sex offenses.").
54 Goodwin, Helping the Child Who Reports Incest: A Case Review, in GOODWIN, supra note 43, at
6 ("Less than 4% of sexual abuse referrals in our experience involved a child making a false report
of a sexual experience with a parent."). See also HERMAN, supra note I, at 166 (citing Giarretto,
Giarretto & Sgroi, Coordinated Community Treatment of Incest, in SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS 233 (1978)) (on the basis of studies of substantiated incest reports, estimates that
fewer than 1% of all reports are false).
55 Id.
56 Goodwin, Helping the Child Who Reports Incest: A Case Review, in GoonwiN, supra note 49, at
6.
62 Goodwin, Sand & Rada, False Accusations and False Denials of Incest: Clinical Myths and Clinical
Realities, in GOODWIN, supra note 49, at 21.
3" Goodwin, Helping the Child Who Reports Incest: A Case Review, in GoonwiN, supra note 49, at
6.
56 HERMAN, supra note I, at 88, 177.
6° Typically, the victim is about nine years old when first approached sexually. HERMAN, supra
note 1, at 83. See also L. SANFORD, THE SILENT CHILDREN 154 (1980). The abusive relationship
usually continues for three or more years. Id. at 154. At that time, the child, usually an adolescent,
comprehends the sexual contact's imprOper nature, and ends the relationship. Id. See also HERMAN,
supra note 1, at 85-86; Jus-ricE, supra note 1, at 27 ("Most authorities also regard incest as a
continuing activity and not a single act.").
ul SANFORD, supra note 60, at 160.
62 Id. See also FINKELHOR, supra note 44, at 18.
63 As Judith Herman states in her book, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST:
Most [victims) were warned not to tell anyone about the sexual episodes. They were
threatened with the most dreadful consequences if they told: their mothers would
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that exposing the abusive relationship may bring it to an end, she often hesitates to
reveal the abuse." Consequently, experts estimate that most incest victims reach adult-
hood without ever revealing their secret."
Childhood incest inflicts serious emotional damage on the survivor." Studies of
adult incest survivors have found that these women often exhibit characteristic psychiatric
problems,17 similar in description to post-traumatic stress disorder. 68 Clinicians frequently
have a nervous breakdown, their parents would divorce, their fathers would be put in
jail, or they themselves would be punished and sent away from home. One way or
another, the girls were given to understand that breaking secrecy would lead to
separation from one or both of their parents .... In some cases, the fathers threatened
severe bodily harm.
HERMAN, supra note 1, at 88. See also SANFORD, supra note 60, at 160-61 ("He always reminds her
that if she breaks the silence, the family will EA apart, she will be sent away, he will go to jail ....
Not exposing it keeps the family together.").
61 SANFORD, supra note 60, at 161. In the victim's mind,-disclosure "would bring on the end of
her world as she knows it." Id.
"I Note, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-
Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 191, 192 (1985) (citing J. RF.NVOIZE, INCEST: A FAMILY
PATTERN 51 (1982)). See also, HERMAN, supra note I, at 88.
66 As Herman notes, however, "[Ilt would be an exaggeration to state that victims of sexual
abuse inevitably sustain permanent damage." HERMAN, supra note I, at 29. Rather than assuming
that the occurrence of incestuous abuse automatically and invariably leads to traumatic mental
illness, "bit seems much more likely ... that the occurrence of incest ... does predispose the
individual to certain kinds of problems." MEISELMAN, supra note 2, at 204. See also HERMAN, supra
note 1, at 29. Furthermore, although the survivor may believe that incest caused her adult diffi-
culties, she may be selecting a dramatic childhood event on which to blame her adult failures,
MEISELMAN, supra note 2, at 196. Moreover, because incest occurs most frequently in chaotic and
otherwise troubled families, it is difficult to isolate the problems caused by incest from the effects
of the overall noxious family environment. MRAZEK, supra note 38, at 227. See also MEISELMAN, supra
note 2, at 195. Thus, the survivor may assert mistakenly that the incestuous abuse caused her injury.
67 Rut see MEISELMAN, supra note 2, at 207 (quoting Henderson, Incest, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE
TrocrBoox or PSYCHIATRY 1537) (2d ed. 1975)) ("Incestuous relationships do not always seem to
have a traumatic effect .. . It has even been suggested that ... such incestuous activity diminishes
the subject's chance of psychosis and allows a better adjustment to the external world.").
68 DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter
DSM-111]. The diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder are:
A. Existence of a recognizable stressor that would evoke significant symptoms of
distress in almost everyone.
B. Reexperiencing of the trauma as evidenced by at least one of the following:
(1) recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event
(2) recurrent dreams of the event
(3) sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were reoccurring, because
of an association with an environmental or ideational stimulus
C. Numbing of responsiveness to or reduced involvement with the external world,
beginning some time after the trauma, as shown by at least one of the following:
(1) markedly diminished interest in one or more significant activities
(2) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
(3) constricted affect
D. At least two of the following symptoms that were not present before the trauma:
(I) hyperalertness or exaggerated startle response
(2) sleep disturbance
(3) guilt about surviving when others have not, or about behavior required for
survival
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describe symptoms ranging from sexual dysfunction 59
 including promiscuity and pros-
titution;" severe depression; 71
 intense guilt; 72
 markedly low self-esteem;" self-destructive
behavior, including drug and alcohol abuse" to an increased risk of future victimiza-
tion;" marital difficulties; 76
 and an increased risk of raising children to become incest
victims." Although these symptoms are not unique to incest survivors, women who were
(4) memory impairment or trouble concentrating
(5) avoidance of activities that arouse recollection of the traumatic event
(6) intensification of symptoms by exposure to events that symbolize or resemble
the traumatic event.
Id. at 238.
GELINAS, supra note 4, at 314. See generally NIEISELMAN, supra note 2, at 221-61 for a thorough
discussion of the variety of sexual problems that incest survivors experience.
7 " Goodwin, Helping the Child Who Reports Incest: A Case Review, in GOODWIN, supra note 49, at
4 (citations omitted). Goodwin states that studies of prostitutes it has been Teported that 50%
are incest victims .... It has been reported that 74% of men incarcerated for, sexual perversions
(rape, exhibiting, pedophilia) have been sexually involved with a family member." Id.
7 ' See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 1, at 99. Herman found that Islixty percent ... of the incest
victims complained of major depressive symptoms in adult life. Thirty-eight percent became so
depressed at some point in their lives that they attempted suicide." Id.
72 See, e.g., id. at 97 ("Although they had been helpless as children to prevent the incest, they
nevertheless felt that they had committed an unpardonable sin which left them permanently
stigmatized."). Id.
7 ' See, e.g., Jus•ricE, supra note I, at 182. The authors believe that:
[plerhaps the most pervasive long-term consequences of incest are the effects it may
have on the daughter's self-image. These effects stem from years of being weighted
down with feelings of both anger and guilt. As a small child, the daughter may not
have known the incestuous behavior was wrong and, therefore, she did not put up
resistance. Once she realizes society condemns it, she starts blaming herself for having
participated.
Id.
74
 Approximately twenty percent of adult incest survivors are alcohol or drug dependents.
HERMAN, supra note 1, at 99. Among severe drug abusers, over Forty percent of the women addicts
were incest victims. Goodwin, Helping the Child Who Reports Incest: A Case Review, in Goonwtx, supra
note 43, at 4.
75 Goodwin, Helping the Child Who. Reports Incest: A Case Review, in GOODWIN, supra note 49, at
4. About fifty percent of female adolescent runaways are incest victims. Id. at 52. "In women who
have been raped three or more times, 30% are incest victims." Id. Judith Herman describes the
victimized incest-survivors' attitude as more noteworthy than the actual incidence of rape. "More
striking than the actual incidence of rape ... was their attitude toward being raped .... Most
reacted to the assaults as if they were deserved punishments." HERMAN, supra note I, at 102.
76
 Although most incest survivors do marry, the incidence of divorce is high. HERMAN, supra
note I, at 29. Many women who were incest victims feel grateful to their husbands for marrying
them, "knowing they had already been used by their fathers." Id. at 100. Also, many of the women
interviewed seemed to lake it for granted that their husbands would mistreat them, and would
"tolerate[) extremes of abuse in their marriages, and took steps to protect themselves only when
their lives were clearly in danger." Id. at 101.
" See SANFORD, supra note 60, at 171-72 for a discussion of typical incest-related symptoms.
Perhaps the most serious consequence of incestuous abuse is its intergenerational effect. Sanford
states that "(11Jo victim intentionally marries a man who will victimize her children, yet statistical
evidence shows that this frequently happens." Id. Many factors contribute to this dynamic, including
confusion about sexuality and trust. Id. at 171. To some extent, we all "use the parenting we
received as children as a model for how we parent our children. If that model was abusive, we are
more likely to be abusive. In addition, we are likely to choose as a partner someone who has a
similar view of parenting." JUSTICE, SUP/I2 note 1, at 198-99.
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sexually abused as children exhibit these behaviors more often than women who were
not so abused."
Some women may not recognize incest-related injuries because the psychological
symptoms may emerge long after the abusive relationship has ended." Research indicates
that For some victims the negative after-effects of incest have a "time bomb" quality,
suddenly emerging after remaining hidden for many years." This "time bomb" quality
can be described clinically as chronic or delayed post-traumatic stress disorder." The
essential feature of post-traumatic stress syndrome is the emergence of distinctive symp-
toms following an emotionally traumatic and unusual event." Although symptoms may
develop immediately following the trauma, frequently the symptoms appear after a
latency period of months or even years following the noxious event." The psychological
impairment may be mild or may encompass all aspects of the victim's life."
Psychologic- al dysfunction generally emerges at. any or all of three stages; first, during
the abusive relationship itself; next, when the victim discloses the abuse and the inces-
tuous relationship ends; and finally, the adult .woman may experience difficulty in
everyday functioning and exhibit other long-term negative effects of the childhood
incest." Indeed, certain developmental milestones, such as the onset of adult sexual
activity, often trigger the symptoms' emergence." Additionally, events, such as when a
daughter approaches the age at which the survivor's abuse began, may trigger symptoms
in the incest-survivor." Thus, despite the child-victim's awareness that sexual contact has
occurred, the long-term negative effects of the incest may not be apparent until long
after the abuse has terminated."
In sum, incest is a widespread tragedy in our society. Because society has refused to
acknowledge the problem, however, many incestuous abuse cases remain undisclosed.
Incest victims experience great psychological, pressures not to reveal their abusive treat-
ment. The severe emotional damage that incest may cause to the child-victim often does
The increased public awareness of incest_ encourages victims to break the silence. This in turn
allows the survivor to receive help and breaks the abusive cycle.
78 HERMAN, supra note 1, at 32. See generally ME1SELMAN, supra note 2, at 194--261.
GELINAS, supra note 4, at 318. The term "traumatic neurosis" is used to describe the chronic
symptoms described in notes 66-78 and accompanying text. .
88 Id.
8I See DSM-III, supra note 68, at 236-38. See supra note 72 for a description of the DSM-I II
diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.
82 Id, at 236.
83 Id, at 237.
84 Id.
" jus•rIcF., supra note I, at 168.
86 GEL1NAS, supra note 4, at 317-18.
87 Id. at 318.
88 There is some support for the theory that the incest victim subconsciously "blocks out" the
incest acts as a method of coping with the trauma. See addendum to Brief for Plaintiff at A-2,
Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72,727 P.2d 226 (1986) (No. 51908.1) [hereinafter Tyson, Brief For
Plaintiff) (affidavit of Lucy Berliner, social worker). It is more likely, however, that
iblecause incest tends to be a repetitive trauma ... total denial about the occurrence of
incest is not very common, Instead ; incest victims may deny the importance of the
experiences .. They may also repress particularly disturbing elements or periods of
time, initially reporting few memories of childhood, or of the incest experiences.
GELINAS, supra note 4, at 316 (emphasis added).
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not become apparent until many years after the sexual relationship terminates. This
time lapse between the abusive contact and the injuries' manifestation creates procedural
and substantive obstacles to the survivor's legal action. Often by the time the survivor is
able to seek redress, the statute of limitations will bar her claim.
11. STATUTES OF LIMITATION
A. Purpose and Application
A statute of limitations requires that all civil actions be brought within a specific
statutory period." Two primary justifications exist for placing time limitations on
claims. 90 First, statutes of limitation operate to assure that the potential defendant will
not be held liable for long-past actions. 91 Second, the statutory period functions to
prevent prosecution of stale claims when memories have faded and evidence and wit-
nesses have disappeared." Underlying both considerations are concerns of fairness to
the defendant.
Statutes of limitation begin to run when the cause of action accrues." Typically, a
cause of action accrues either at the time of the defendant's wrongful act or at the time
of plaintiff's injury. 94 The accrual date is easy to calculate when the defendant's miscon-
duct and the subsequent injury occur simultaneously. Such calculation, however, becomes
complicated when substantial time elapses between the wrongful act and the injury."
Whether a tort is classified as intentional or negligent affects its accrual date. Because
an intentional tort creates an immediate right to nominal damages without proof of
harm, most courts measure the statutory period from the date the wrongful act occurs,
regardless of when the plaintiff sustains the injury." In a negligence action, in contrast,
harm is an essential element and the statute of limitations generally does not begin to
run until the harm actually results. 97
In some situations, fairness to the plaintiff recognizes exceptions to the statute of
limitations. For example, state law permits the limitations period to be tolled," and its
69
	 of limitation are legislatively determined time periods, after which an action cannot
be maintained. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979). For examples of statutes, see e.g.,
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE 340.1 (West Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 260, 4 (Supp. 1987); N.J.
Rev. STAT. § 2A:14-1 (1987); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 213 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
t , See generally Developments, supra note 14, at 1185.
91 See, e.g. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938); Equilease Corp. v. State Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 647 F.2d 1069,
1073 (10th Cir. 1981). See also generally Developments, supra note 14, at 1185.
92 Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
" E.g., Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 120.
94 See, e.g., Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223, 228 (5th Cir. 1984); Baron v. Allied
Artists Pictures Corp., 717 F.2d 105, 108 (3d Cir. 1983). See also generally Fischer, supra note 14, at
4; Developments, supra note 14, at 1200.
" Developments, supra note 14, at 1200.
96 See, e.g., Albertson, 749 F.2d at 228; Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185,
197 n.16 (3d Cir. 1984); Menton v. Gessell, 714 F.2d 87, 89 (9th Cir. 1983).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Gutterman, 701 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1983); Steele v. United
States, 599 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 899 comment
e (1977); Developments, supra note 14, at 1201 (citing Theurer v. Condon, 209 P.2d 311 (Wash.
1949)).
"Tolling is described as the process of ''delaying a cause of action's accrual, thus suspending
the statute of limitations, until the applicable disability ends." Fischer, supra note 19, at 3.
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running delayed, because the plaintiff suffers certain disabilities, such as the plaintiff's
insanity, infancy or imprisonment, that makes it unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to
assert his or her rights. 99 Typically, once the plaintiff is no longer disabled, the statutory
period begins to run. 10°
Furthermore, many state legislatures and courts recognize the principle of equitable
tolling in circumstances involving fraud, undue influence or duress, breach of fiduciary
relationships, and inherently undiscoverable injuries.103 Even though the plaintiff's right
to recovery may already exist, equitable tolling delays the running of the limitations
period until he or she either knows or should know of the injury. 02 Courts reason that
the plaintiff's ignorance of the injury is inherent in the tort, as well as the direct result
of the defendant's wrongful conduct. 03 Similarly, courts often make an exception for
undue influence or duress, recognizing that although the plaintiff may be aware of the
basic facts, he or she is not likely to sue. 109 These exceptions for inherently unknowable
harm apply when the plaintiff is unlikely to know of the injury before the statute expires,
even if he or she could have recovered substantial damages during the limitations
period. 105 For all such exceptions to the limitations periods, the statute is tolled until it
is reasonable to charge a plaintiff, capable of bringing suit, with awareness of all the
elements of a cause of action.
B. The Discovery Rule
The current judicial trend is to expand application of equitable tolling principles,
especially in circumstances involving inherently unknowable harm." Although the gen-
eral rule is that ignorance of a cause of action does not postpone accrual, 107 courts apply
99 See, e.g. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 352 (West Stipp. 1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 260 § 7 (Stipp.
1987); N.Y. CR'. PRAC. L. & R. § 208 (McKinney Stipp. 1988), Some states do not toll the statute
of limitations for imprisonment. See, e.g., N.J. Ray. STA•. § 2A:14-21 (1987).
While a plaintiff can easily establish infancy and imprisonment, insanity is more difficult to
determine. For the purpose of statutes of limitation, insanity is an incapacity severe enough to
render the individual unable to function in everyday life. John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist.,
194 Cal. App. 3d 1454, 240 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987). The John R. court declined "to hold that a
condition that allows the [plaintiff] to continue normal daily activities and is completely undetectable
... can nonetheless constitute mental incapacity within the meaning of [the statute]." Id. at 324,
240 Cal. Rpt.r. at 1463.
1 "" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-241(1975) (The limitation is the lesser of the statutory limit or three
years after removal of the disability.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8116 (1986) (The statute of
limitations runs for three years after disability is removed); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 260 § 7 (Stipp. 1987)
(the original statutory period runs alter the disability is removed).
101 See generally Developments, supra note 14, at 1203-05, 1214-22.
102 Stoleson v. United States, 029 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Kubrick,
444 U.S. 1 1 I, 120 n.7 (1980)).
n's See Developments, supra note 14, at 1217 (citing Schoedel v. State Bank of Newburg, 245 Wis.
74, 13 N.W.2d 534 (1944); Young v. Howard, 120 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1941)). Because the plaintiff
is usually forbidden by law to interfere in managing the trust, tolling the statutory period for breach
of fiduciary ditty acknowledges the plaintiff's ignorance of the malfeasance. Developments, supra note
14, at 1215.
L04 Id. at 1219.
105 Id. at 1213.
'a" Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 63I, 635, 43l A.2d 677, 680 (1981) (quoting flung• 	 v. Johns-
Manville Prods., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 209, 306 (1978)).
" Fischer, supra note 19, at 5 (citing April Enter. v. KT -pi, 147 Cal, App. 3d 805, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 421 (1983)).
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a "discovery rule" to toll the statute where it is equitable to do so. 105 Specifically, where
the injury is insidious, latent, or hidden, the discovery rule tolls the limitations period
until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury.")° Thus, the
discovery rule's purpose is to suspend the statute of limitations in situations where the
policy behind the limitation"° is outweighed by the injustice that would result when a
diligent plaintiff is barred completely from recovery through no fault of his or her
"m il]
The original source of the discovery rule is the 1949 United States Supreme Court
case of Urie v. Thompsorz.'I 2 In Urie, a fireman for the Missouri Pacific Railroad brought
a negligence action for damages sustained from the constant inhalation of silica dust
throughout his thirty years of employment with the railroad." 5 As a result of this
allegedly negligent exposure to the dust, Urie contracted silicosis, a permanently dis-
abling pulmonary disease."' The railroad claimed that the three year statute of limita-
tions barred Urie's claim because his exposure to the silica dust for nearly thirty years
meant that he must have contracted silicosis long before bringing suit." 5
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument, stating that if Urie were
barred from bringing this action, his remedy would be meaningless." 6 Because his
symptom's had not emerged within the applicable statutory period, Uric could not have
brought suit earlier." 7 Reasoning that if a traditional statute of limitations was applied,
Urie would have no rights to compensation when his disabling disease was discovered.
The Court refused to accept that the legislature intended blameless ignorance to bar
such an action, and thus permitted Urie's suit to proceed. 115
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Stoleson v. United
Slates, clarified the Urie Court's enunciation of the discovery rule."° The Stoleson court,
holding that the discovery rule applied to actions brought under the Federal Torts Claim
Act, delayed accrual of the claimant's cause of action until she reasonably should have
discovered the cause of her injury.' 20 Stoleson's job with the Badger Army Ammunition
188 1d. (citing Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 324, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 591, 595 (1980)).
"719 Id,
"U See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy and purposes
of statutes of limitation.
Developments, supra note 14, at 1205.
112 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
Id, at 165-66.
Id.
"5 1d. at 169.
1161d.
" 7 1d,
" 8 1d. at 169-70. The Urie Court stated that:
If Uric were held barred from prosecuting this action ... it would be clear that the
federal legislation afforded Uric only a delusive remedy. It would mean that at some
past moment in time ... Uric was charged with knowledge of the [injury]; under this
view Urie's failure to diagnose within the applicable statute of limitations a disease
whose symptoms had not yet obtruded on his consciousness would constitute waiver
of his right to compensation at the ultimate day of discovery and disability We
do not think the humane legislative plan intended such consequences to attach to
blameless ignorance.
Id.
118 629 F,2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).
128
 Id. at 1269.
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Plant exposed her to nitroglycerin. After one year of continuous exposure, the plaintiff
experienced chest pains and angina attacks and was hospitalized for several weeks. 121
She continued to experience these attacks until the plant terminated her employment.' 22
Although Stoleson suspected a causal connection between her illness and her exposure
to nitroglycerin, Stoleson's physicians informed her that no medically recognized causal
link existed to support her claim.'" Three years after her initial hospitalization, however,
an article was published in her union newspaper which suggested the connection between
angina and chronic nitroglycerin exposure. Stoleson consulted a different physician, who
concluded that her medical problems were definitely connected to her exposure. Stoleson
filed a claim fifteen months later. 12'
Stressing Stoleson's diligent pursuit of medical information to support her suspicion
that nitroglycerin exposure caused her illness,'" the court of appeals held that the
plaintiff's blameless ignorance of the cause or existence of an injury tolled the statute
of limitations,'" The Stoleson court reaffirmed Urie's discovery rule, stating that the
nature of the injury and the obstacles the plaintiff must overcome to discover the injury's
cause determine the applicability of the discovery rule. 127 Thus, the court stated that a
finding of "blameless ignorance" is critical, and any plaintiff who is faultlessly unaware
of any injury or its cause will be granted the benefits of the discovery rule.' 28
Although the discovery rule was initially applied in the areas of latent physical
disease 129 and medical malpractice,'" it is now used in many other areas of the law."'
121 Id. at 1266.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1267.
Id.
' 23 Id. at 1270.
' 26 1d, at 1269.
Iv' Id.
128 1d. The dissenting judge in Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir.
1952), eloquently described the discovery rule. As Judge Frank explained,
Ielxcept in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived, or be divorced
before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a house never
built, or miss a train running on a non-existent railroad. For substantially similar
reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal 'axiom,' that a statute
of Ihnitations does not begin to run against a cause of action before that cause of
action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff.
Id. (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
"9 See, e.g., Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (silicosis resulting from exposure to silica
dust); Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1985) (leukemia resulting from
exposure to radiation leaking from a uranium processing plant); Stoleson, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.
1980) (severe angina attacks resulting from industrial exposure to nitroglycerin while employed at
munitions plant). But see Joyce v. A.C. & S., Inc., 785 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1986) (court hell that
discovery rule did not apply to asbestos-related diseases from exposure to asbestos where X-rays
showed pleural thickening eleven years before plaintiff brought action).
0° See, e.g., Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962) (transfusion of the wrong
blood type caused stillbirth of child more than three years later); Burke v. Washington Hosp.
Center, '293 F. Supp, 1328 (D.D.C. 1968) (foreign object left in plaintiff's wound for five years);
Ruth v. bight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969) (surgical sponge left inside plaintiff for
twenty-three years before discovery).
See generally, City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382, 388-89 (10th Cir. 1979) (cause
of action for malpractice against engineer or architect does not accrue until the plaintiff knew or
reasonably should have known of all the elements of that action). Although most jurisdictions apply
the discovery rule in some circumstances, Maryland is the only state whose courts have adopted a
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For example, courts have applied its rationale to malpractice cases involving attorneys, 132
dentists,' accountants," architects and engineers.'Moreover, most courts will apply
the discovery rule to almost any negligence action where the plaintiff is blamelessly
ignorant of the injury. 16
Unlike negligence actions, in contrast, courts are reluctant to apply the discovery
rule to intentional torts, even where the plaintiff has no means to detect the harm.'"
Most intentional torts involve the simultaneous occurrence of wrongful conduct and
resulting har ► .'" Thus, the plaintiff usually is aware of the misconduct at the time of
the violation. Some intentional torts, however, involve a plaintiff who could not discover
his or her harm." Despite such blameless ignorance, courts rarely toll the statute of
date of discovery rule for all civil actions. See Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d
677, 680 (1981).
"2 See, e.g., Levin v. Henley, 728 F.2d 551 (1st Cir. 1984); Byers v. Burleson, 713 F.2d 856 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); Yazzie v.-Olney, Levy, Kaplan & Termer, 593 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1979).
'" See, e.g., Faith v. Erhart, 52 Cal. App. 2d 228, 126 P.2d 151 (1942).
19' See, e.g., Chisolm v. Schott, 86 N.M. 707, 526 P.2d 1300 (1974); Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal.
App. 2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967).
I95
	 e.g., City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2t1 382 (10th Cir. 1979); Kundahl v. Barnett,
5 Wash. App. 227, 486 1'.2d 1164 (1971); Banner v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300 (Wyo. 1970).
75
 of., DeGette v. Mine Co. Restaurant, 751 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1985) (in copyright infringe-
ment and theft of trade secret litigation, cause of action did not accrue until plaintiff's reasonable
diligence revealed the infringement); Gazija v. Nicholas terns Co., 86 Wash. 2d 215, 543 P.2d 338
(1975) (cause of action against insurance agent accrued when plaintiff reasonably discovered injury).
1 " Cf. Fleury v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 698 F.2d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 1983). An incest
survivor may bring a traditional tort action, such as assault, battery, or infliction of emotional distress
in an effort to be compensated for her injury. Survivors have had limited success with these actions
because of statute of limitations procedural problems. Cf. Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah
1980). The classification of incestuous abuse as an intentional tort, however, presents other difficult
procedural obstacles.
Intent, as used in the context of tort theory, suggests that the actor desires the consequences
which flow from his act, or is substantially certain that the consequences will result from the act.
See, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 202, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (1955). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A (1965). By definition, intent must be shown to establish a prima facie
case of battery, assault, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, §§ 18, 21, 46 (1965). An intentional tort does not require that the plaintiff show that an
injury occurred because even absent harm, a plaintiff may maintain an action. Id. at § 7 comment
a. Thus, the elements of an intentional tort are established, and the cause of action accrues, when
the defendant commits the wrongful act. Inasmuch as incest is an intentional tort, the plaintiff's
cause of action accrues at the time of the assault. An adult survivor's claim for incest-related injury
is thus time-barred under traditional tort analysis. See Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d
226 (1986).
178 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Towrs, § 18 (1965) (battery).
"9 See, e.g., id. at
	
559 (defamation). A majority of courts hold that a cause of action in
defamation accrues at the time of publication. See, e.g,, Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., 704
F.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (4th Cir. 1983); Lashlee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d 107, 109 (6th Cir. 1978);
Morgan v. Hustler Magazine, 653 F. Supp. 711, 717 (N.D. Ohio 1987); L. Cohen & Co., Inc. v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (D. Conn. 1986). Some courts, however, delay
accrual of a cause of action in defamation until the plaintiff reasonably can discover the injury. See,
e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 576 (D.C. Md. 1982); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Ulman, 287 Md. 397, 401, 412 A.2d 1240, 1242 (1980). See also U.S. Oil & Refining Co. v.
State Department of Ecology, 96 Wash. 2d 85, 633 P.2d 1329, 1333-34 (1981) (discovery rule tolls
the statute of limitations against an oil company that polluted intentionally, in violation of their
waste disposal permit).
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limitations in such cases, other than for infancy, incapacity, or imprisonment.'" Most
courts reason that because an intentional tort victim has an immediate right to nominal
damages without proof of harm, the cause of action accrues when the tort occurs."'
In sum, courts developed the discovery rule in order to mitigate the harsh results
arising from mechanical application of statutes of limitation. The rule tolls the limitations
period until the blamelessly ignorant plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known
of the harm. Courts generally apply the discovery rule to negligence actions and are
reluctant to extend the discovery rule to intentional torts. Because the plaintiff can
maintain a legal action at the time the Offensive contact occurs regardless of actual injury,
courts are unwilling to read such exceptions into statutes of limitation and leave the
potential defendant forever at risk.
III. CIVIL INCEST SUITS AND STATUTES OF LIMITATION
A. Judicial Application of Statutes of Limitation to Civil Incest Suits
Despite the growing public awareness of the child sexual assault problem," 2 few
courts have considered whether the discovery rule applies in the context of sexual abuse
claims." 3 Courts generally apply the discovery rule to negligence claims where the
plaintiff was blamelessly ignorant of the injury.L 44 Because incestuous abuse is an inten-
tional tort, courts generally have found that the victim's cause of action accrues at the
time sexual contact occurs.'" Recently, however, one court applied the discovery rule to
the intentional tort of childhood sexual assault.'"
In September 1987, the California Court of Appeals upheld the discovery rule's
application to a sexual assault case in which the child-victim did not inform his parents
of the assault until the statute of limitations expired. 147 In John R. v. Oakland Unified
School District, a school teacher sexually assaulted a minor child during a tutoring session
at the teacher's home.'" Although the child clearly knew the contact had occurred, he
°° See, e.g. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352 (West Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 260 1/ 7 (Supp.
1987); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 208 (McKinney Supp. 1988). Some states do not toll the statute
of limitations for imprisonment. See e.g., N.J. Rev. STAT. § 2A:14-21 (1987).
' 41 See, e.g., Albertson, 749 F.2d at 228; Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185,
197 n.16 (3d Cir. 1984); Menton v. Gessell, 714 F.2d 87, 89 (9th Cir. 1983).
142 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the increasing public
awareness of the incest problem.
143 In Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986), the court applied the discovery
rule to a sexual assault case. The Simmons court tolled the statute of limitations until the plaintiff
discovered that her psychotherapist's conduct caused her post-traumatic stress disorder, where the
psychotherapist wrongfully engaged her in a sexual relationship. Id. at 1367. Simmons did not sue
the psychotherapist for his intentional assault, however, but brought suit against the government
for negligent supervision under the Federal Torts Claim Act. Id. at 1363.
L44 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of tolling the statute of
limitations in negligent tort actions.
145 See, e.g. Tyson v, Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986).
146 See John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1454, 240 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1987).
147 Id. at 1466, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 326. The John R. court stated that "[Ole interests of justice
require that a cause of action based on the sexual assault of a minor by his or her teacher is deemed
to accrue at the time the parent discovers, or should have discovered, the assault." Id.
148 1d. at 1469, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
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did not tell his parents of the incident until almost one year later. By that time, the
statute of limitations barred the parents' claim even though they acted diligently and
filed a claim within eight months. 145 Reasoning that the rationale for delayed discovery•
applied to child sexual abuse claims, the court held that where the blameless child
understands the injury but delays disclosure to a responsible adult because of threats
arising from the sexual assault itself, rather than his own dilatory conduct, the child's
knowledge should not bar suit. 15° Thus, the John R. court found that although the
discovery rule's application to an intentional tort broke new legal ground, it was appro-
priate where the tort's effects are latent. 15 '
Similarly, in 1986 the Washington Supreme Court, in Tyson v. Tyson, considered the
discovery rule's application to a father-daughter incestuous abuse claim, and held, in a
live-to-four decision, that it did not.'" In Tyson, the plaintiff, twenty-six year old Tyson,
filed a claim against her father alleging a pattern of sexual assault that occurred when
she was between three and eleven years of age. 153 Tyson stated that she had suppressed
the memory of the incest until she entered psychotherapy when she was twenty-five
years old. The defendant claimed that the three year statute of limitations barred the
action.' 54 In response, Tyson argued that a parent owes the highest possible fiduciary
duty to his child and that parental authority causes the victim to believe she must tolerate
the incest. 155 Because most incest victims accept the blame for the sexual abuse, Tyson
also asserted it is reasonable for a survivor to be unable to make the causal connection
between childhood incest and adult psychological problems.' 56 Thus, the plaintiff claimed
that she filed her claim as soon as she reasonably could, and her cause of action was
timely. 1"
1 4'5 Id. at 1458, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
15 " Id. at 1466, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 326. Other courts have considered the degree of the abuser's
authority over the child and the severity of the threat in order to decide whether to apply the
discovery rule. The courts review whether the victim failed to discover the injury because of the
underlying tort's continuing effects. See, e.g., State v. Bentley, 239 Kan. 334, 335, 338, 721 P.2d
227, 228, 230 (1986) (uncle's threat to his niece not to reveal the assault or he would "try to do it
again" held not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations); State v. Danielski, 348 N.W.2d 352, 356
(Minn. App. 1984) (statute of limitations in criminal incest case tolled until the child no longer was
subject to the parental authority that prevented her From reporting the sexual abuse at the time it
occurred); State v. French, 392 N.W.2d 596, 598-600 (Minn. App. 1986) (applying the Danielski
test, the court held that the uncle's authority over his niece was not sufficient to toll the statute of
limitations when the victim had limited contact with the defendant following the abusive acts).
194 Cal. App. 3d at 1463, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 324. The court stressed the narrowness of its
holding, stating that "we do not believe the rationale for the [discovery] rule can survive an
unconditional incursion into this area {of intentional torts], it may be appropriate where the effects
of the tort itself are latent or otherwise suppressed." Id.
152 107 Wash.2d 72, 79-80, 727 P.2d 226, 230 (1986). See generally Note, Balancing the Statute of
Limitations and the Discovery Rule: Some Victim of Incestuous Abuse are Denied Access to Washington Courts
—'Tyson v. Tyson, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 721 (1987).
'" Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 74, 727 P.2d at 227.
154 Id.
155 Tyson, Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 88, at 16-17, B-5 (affidavit of Nelson, Ph.D.).
155 See Brief of Amiens Curiae, Northwest Women's Law Center, at 21, Tyson v. Tyson, 107
Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986) (No. 51908-1). The four dissenting judges agreed that if the
discovery rule applies to the breach of an adult's trust by a professional — trusted doctor, attorney
or employee — then certainly the "breach of a child's trust by a father or other authority figure
who exploits the child for sexual gratification" presents an even stronger case for tolling the statute.
Tyson at 91-92, 727 P.2(1 at 236 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
157 Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 75, 727 P.2d at 227.
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A four judge plurality granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground
that the three year statute of limitations barred the action)" The plurality reasoned that
with stale claims, reliable evidence is often lacking. Absent objective, verifiable evidence
of the alleged wrongful act and the resultant injury, the court determined that their
fact-finding abilities would be impaired.?''' Thus, applying the discovery rule to claims
of emotional damages remembered only years after the limitations period expired would
put the defendant at an unacceptable risk, undermining the statute's purpose.m
The plurality also rejected Tyson's contention that even absent objective, verifiable
facts proving the incest, such as witnesses, police reports, or medical records, psycholog-
ical testimony would produce the evidence to support her claim.' 61 The court stated that
unlike the biological sciences, psychological investigation is not based on concrete; phys-
ical observations. Reasoning that recollection of long-past events through psychotherapy
does not prove their occurrence, the plurality rejected the assumption that psychother-
apists have any special truth-determining abilities.'"
Four judges dissented, arguing thht the discovery rule should toll the limitations
period for Tyson's claim. 1 " Stating that the purpose of the discovery rule is to prevent
the injustice that results from the mechanical application of statutes of limitation, the
dissent asserted that the majority relied on an inaccurate understanding of the discovery
rule's purpose and application.'" The dissent reasoned that the existence of "objective,
verifiable evidence" of the alleged wrong is simply one factor to be weighed in balancing
the plaintiff's right to sue against the defendant's risk of defending a stale claim.
According to the dissent, because fundamental fairness, not objective proof, is the crux
of the discovery rule, the majority erred in barring plaintiff's claim as a matter of law.1 65
The dissent argued that summary judgment for the defendant should be denied because
the plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to convince the fact-finder that she
discovered or should have discovered her cause of action only after the statute of
limitations expired. 166 To decide otherwise, the dissent asserted, denies adult incest
survivors a legal remedy.167
The dissent further noted that the majority discredited the value of mental health
professionals as expert witnesses.' 68 Contending that ,the majority premised its assump-
tion that psychological testimony is inherently unreliable on a single law review article,
the dissent argued that such testimony is merely an aid to the fact-finder, for it to accept
or reject.'" Maintaining that the legal system relies on psychological expertise in a variety
of situations, the dissent declared the majority's rejection of this evidence as an attempt
to "disinvent the wheel." 1 "
158 Id. at 79-80, 727 P.2d at 230. Justice Goodloe also concurred in the majority opinion.
159 Id. at 75-76, 727 P.2d at 228.
ma Id, at 76, 727 P.2d at 228.
16 ' Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 78-79, 727 P.2d at 229.
62 1d. at 78, 727 P.2d at. 229.
163 Id. at 80, 727 P.2d at 230 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 80-82, 727 P.2d at 230-01 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
160 Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 82, 727 P.2d at 231 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
' 66 Id. at 82-84, 727 P.2d at 231-32 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
," Id. at 89, 727 P.2d at 235 (Pearson, J., dissenting),
168
	
at 85-87, 727 P.2d at 232-33 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
168 Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 86, 727 P.2d at 233 (Pearson, J., dissenting) (citing Wesson, Historical
Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60 WAsil. L. REV. 331 (1965).
17° Id. at 87, 727 P.2d at 233 (Pearson, J., dissenting) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
896).
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The dissent also asserted that the majority's decision ignored the severity of the
child sexual abuse problem."' Because of the nature of father-daughter incest, including
the father's demand for secrecy and the delayed emergence of incest-related injuries,
the dissent argued that the survivor's need for maturity before she can confront her
childhood assault often makes it impossible to file suit within the limitations period.'"
The dissent asserted, therefore, that imposing a literal application of the statute of
limitations to childhood sexual abuse actions effectively denies incest-survivors a rem-
edy."' The dissent concluded that fundamental fairness required applying the discovery
rule to civil incest actions. 14
A concurring opinion accepted the plurality's decision, yet acknowledged the dis-
sent's compelling arguments.'" The concurring judge asserted that judicial application
of the discovery rule was inappropriate in the face of legislative inaction, and that to
adopt the dissent's position would result in improper judicial policy-making. The con-
curring judge was unwilling to invade what he considered the legislature's exclusive
province, and thus, for this reason only, joined in the court's decision.'"
Similarly, courts have held that the discovery rule barred incestuous abuse claims
where the plaintiff knew of the sexual abuse and was aware of some degree of emotional
distress, however slight, when the injury occurred.'" These courts found that the cause
of action accrued at the time of the incestuous incident."s No court since Tyson, however,
has applied the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse claims where the plaintiff
alleges that she was totally unaware of both the existence of the tort and any injury until
after the statute of limitations expired. It is clear, however, that where the plaintiff
1 " Id. at 87, 727 P.2d at 233-34 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 88-89, 727 P.2d at 234-35 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
"'Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 89, 727 P.2d at 235 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
14 1d. at 90, 727 P.2d at 235 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
"6 Id. at 80, 727 P.2d at 230 (Goodloe, J., concurring).
16 Id. (Gooctloe, J., concurring).
"7 See, e.g., Raymond v. Ingram, 47 Wash. App. 781, 737 P.2d 314 (1987); Smith v. Smith, No.
CI V-85-285E (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
'"1 In May 1987, the Washington Court of Appeals followed the Tyson ruling in Raymond v.
Ingram, holding the plaintiff's claim time-barred. 47 Wash. App. 781, 737 P.2d 314 (1987). Unlike
Tyson, the plaintiff in Raymond did not claim that she was unaware of the assault until after the
statutory period had expired. Instead, Raymond admitted that she remembered both the assault
and the associated mental distress before she entered therapy. Id. at 787, 737 P.2d at 317. Her
claim was that she did not know that her current problems were connected with the childhood
abuse until she entered therapy. Id. at 783, 737 P.2d at 315. The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding that, because Raymond was aware of the abuse and experienced some degree of
emotional distress during the statutory period, her cause of action for sexual assault accrued when
she reached the age of majority and was thus time-barred. Id. at 787, 737 P.2d at 317.
Similarly, in November 1986, the United States District Court for the Western District of New
York decided the case of Smith v, Smith, holding that the discovery rule barred the plaintiff's
childhood incest claim. No. CIV-85-285E (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
The Smith plaintiff' alleged that her father sexually abused her from the ages of one to twelve years.
Id. at 1. Although the plaintiff, Smith, claimed that she had suppressed the worst and most traumatic
acts of abuse until she entered therapy, she admitted that she knew before the statutory period had
expired that her father had sexually assaulted her. Id. at 2, 4. Consequently, the Smith court, in
granting summary judgment for the defendant, held that her cause of action accrued upon majority
and was time-barred when she filed suit. Id. at 5. Accord DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011,
242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987).
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concedes that she knew the abuse caused her injury during the statutory period, the
action accrues at the date sexual contact occurred.'"
B. The Legislative Response
Presently, California is the only state that has enacted legislation specifically extend-
ing the statute of limitations in civil actions for incestuous abuse.'" The California statute
extends the statute of limitations from one to three years in any civil action for injury
related to sexual contact with a child under the age of fourteen and a member of the
child's household."' Under the statute, the definition of incest-related injury expressly
includes psychological injury or illness, whether or not accompanied by physical symp-
toms. 1 e' The California legislature explicitly declined to preclude judicial application of
the discovery rule, intending this statute to require at the minimum a limited tolling of
the statutory period.'"
Similar legislation filed during the 1987 Massachusetts legislative session, proposed
extending the statute of limitations for civil claims arising out of childhood sexual
abuse,'" A fact sheet issued by co-sponser State Senator Carol Amick described the
victim's tendency to blame herself, the exploitation of familial trust and the assailant's
demand for secrecy, and concluded that these factors often prevent the victim from
exercising her legal rights within the existing statutory period.'" The Massachusetts
House version of the bill extends the limitations period from three to twenty years and
applies to all cases of childhood sexual assault.'" The Senate version applies only to
incestuous abuse and extends the time within which a victim can bring suit for damages
to ten years following the plaintiff's eighteenth birthday."'
in November 1987, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a statute that extended
the limitations period for criminal prosecution of sexual crimes against children.'" The
"'See supra note l78 For a discussion of two cases involving plaintiffs that knew within the
statutory period that childhood abuse had occurred,
180 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1988).
Id. § 310.1(a). The statute provides that:
(a) In any civil action for injury or illness based upon lewd or lascivious acts with a
child under the age of 14 years ... in which this conduct is alleged to have occurred
between a household or family member and a child where the act upon which the
action is based occurred before the plaintiff attained the age of 18 years, the time for
commencement of the action shall be three years.
Id.
1" Id, § 340.1(b) ("Injury or illness . .. includes psychological injury or illness, whether or not
accompanied by physical injury or illness.").
183 Id. Section 340.1(d) provides that "Infothing in this bill is intended to preclude the courts
from applying delayed discovery exceptions to the accrual of a cause of action for sexual molestation
of a minor." Id.
184 S. 722, 175 Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Mass.; H.R. 5745, 175 Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Mass.
185 S. 722 Fact Sheet, 175 Leg., 1st Sess. Mass. 1987 (Sen. Carol Amick).
188 H.R. 5745, 175 Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Mass,
187 S. 722, 175 Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Mass, lioth Massachusetts bills recognize the need to extend
the time in which a victim can bring suit in order to give her a reasonable opportunity to seek
redress as an adult.
L 88 Mass. Gen. L. ch. 277, 63 (amended Nov. 10, 1987). Under this new statute, the limitations
period does not begin to run until the violation is reported or the victim reaches the age of sixteen.
This extension applies to crimes of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen,
rape, and other sex offenses. Id.
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legislature lengthened the statute of limitations from six to ten years, beginning when
the child reaches the age of sixteen or reports the assault to legal authorities, whichever
occurs first. The amended statute of limitations applies to sexual assault victims under
age sixteen.'"
In sum, because incest is an intentional tort, courts hesitate to apply the discovery
rule to delay the cause of action's accrual. As a result, most courts deny relief to adult
incest survivors. In light of the seriousness of the incest problem and the unique circum-
stances which surround its occurrence, the law should become more responsive to incest
claims. It is the obligation of the state legislatures to act, by adopting legislation to
preserve the rights of adult incest survivors.
IV. APPLYING THE DISCOVERY RULE TO CIVIL INCEST
Incest clearly is traumatic for the child or adolescent who must endure either the
sexual abuse or the consequences of disclosure.'" It is the adult survivor of childhood
incest, however, whose suffering is the hardest to diagnose, treat, and redress.' 91 Despite
the fact that all states outlaw sexual contact with children, child sexual abuse cases rarely
are prosecuted and it is even more rare that an offender is punished. 192
Although every state has enacted a statute that prohibits intrafamilial sexual relations
with children,'" the threat of criminal sanctions does little to protect the incest victim.
Although the penalties for sexual relations with a child appear to be harsh, in practice
abusers are rarely discovered or prosecuted.' 91 To begin with, victims are often afraid
to complain. Most incestuous fathers are acutely aware of the penalties for sexual crimes
against children, and often silence their daughters by portraying horrifying results if the
incest is revealed.'" Because most children do not want to punish their fathers no matter
how terrible the abuse, the severe penalties for sexual crimes may do more to reinforce
the secrecy of the relationship than to deter the parent's abusive conduct.' 96
Civil remedies must be available to survivors to supplement criminal sanctions. Not
only may the victim need pecuniary compensation for her injuries, but the award of
damages acts as an emotional catharsis, relieving her from blame for the abusive rela-
189 Id.
IS° See supra notes 59-65, 192-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems
faced by incest victims and the criminal justice system's response when childhood sexual abuse is
disclosed.
191 See generally GELINAS, supra note 4. See also supra notes 66-88 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the difficulties presented by the delayed emergence of symptoms many years after
the incestuous abuse ceases.
192
	 supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criminal justice system's
inability to deal with the problem of incest. See generally HERMAN, supra note I, at 162-76.
I" See generally Bienan, The Incest Statutes, in HERMAN, supra note 1, at 221-59.
1" HERMAN, .SUPra note I, at 163. Even when criminal charges are brought against an incestuous
father, it is unlikely that he will be prosecuted, convicted, or jailed. Id. at 164. In a study of 250
police reports of sexual assaults on children in New York City, in seventy-five percent of the cases
either no arrest was ever made or the accused was arraigned but never tried. Id. at 167. Of the
number of men brought to trial and convicted, more than half received fines, suspended sentences
or probation. Id. Only nine percent were sent to prison, with the average sentence consisting of
one year or less. Id. Clearly the criminal justice system does not adequately respond to the problem
of incestuous abuse.
199 id. at 163.
196 Id.
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tionship and proving that society will not condone incest.. 197 If the fact-finder awards
punitive damages, her father's culpability is underscored.'gs Furthermore, granting mon-
etary damages benefits victims of incest as a class. If the father is subject to civil liability
for incest-related injuries, society will recognize the survivor's lack of culpability and will
begin to understand the injury to innocent victims. 199 Society then will encourage victims
to end the abusive relationship and to seek assistance from appropriate sources. Thus,
because the criminal justice system is unable to address effectively the problem of
incestuous abuse, meaningful tort remedies must be available to vindicate the incest
victim's rights.
A. Judicial Application of the Discovery Rule to Incest is Inappropriate
The discovery rule generally does not apply to intentional torts. Incestuous abuse
is an intentional tort. 200 Like Other assault victims, an abused child knows that contact
has occurred. In contrast to other assault victims, however, the incest victim probably
does not know that the contact is wrong or that her father may be held liable in a court
of law for his actions. Although a victim's ignorance of his or her legal rights does not
ordinarily bar a claim's accrual under traditional tort theory, courts do toll statutes of
limitation for legally incompetent or blamelessly ignorant plaintiffs."'
For example, courts frequently toll limitations periods in situations involving fraud,
undue influence or duress, fiduciary relationships, and inherently undiscoverable
harm.202 In deciding whether to apply the discovery rule, courts balance the defendant's
rights to be free from stale claims against the plaintiff's reasons for failing to bring a
timely action. 205 Courts applying the discovery rule reason that the plaintiff's ignorance
of harm is inherent in the wrong itself, and the result of the defendant's deliberate
actions."' Thus, courts often delay a cause of action's accrual until the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the harm. 205
Given the courts' rationale for delaying accrual for fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty claims, tolling the limitations period in incestuous abuse complaints until the victim
knew or should have known of the injury seems appropriate. 2" Indeed, in 1987 the
'" See HERMAN, supra note 1, at 169. Moreover, civil damage assessment underscores the liability
of defendants who escape conviction altogether.
19" Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 609, 617 (1983).
10"
	 Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S
189, 189-90 n.2 (1984).
200Classification of incest as a negligent tort would remove most procedural obstacles to the
discovery rule's application. it would, however, alter the definition of negligence beyond recognition.
401 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979). See also supra notes 98-105 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of tolling the statute of limitations.
002 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. for a discussion of these tolling provisions.
2"3 See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors weighed by
the court to determine discovery rule application.
204 Developments, supra note 14, at 1217.
202 The distinction between immediate and delayed accrual traditionally rests on the classifica-
tion of the tort as intentional or negligent. Inasmuch as an intentional tort creates an immediate
right to recovery without proof of harm, the statutory period is usually measured from the time of
the wrongful act regardless of when injury is sustained. Developments, supra note 14, at 1200-01. In
contrast, since actual injury is a necessary element of an action in negligence, the statute of limitations
is often not tolled until the harm actually results. Id. at 1201.
205 Cf. John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1454, 240 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1987). See supra notes 147-51 for a discussion of John R.
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California Court of Appeals, in John R. v. Oakland Unified School District, analogized the
circumstances surrounding a schoolteacher's sexual assault of a minor to cases of fraud
or breach of fiduciary duty. 2"7 The John R. court, in a well reasoned opinion, applied
the discovery rule, thus tolling the parents' cause of action against the teacher where
their son did not tell his parents of the assault until after the statutory period had
expired. The court reasoned that the child's injury itself prevented his disclosure. There-
fore, the John R. court, facing an assault victim's blameless ignorance, applied the
discovery rule to an intentional tort. 2"8
Despite the John R. decision, most courts do not extend the discovery rule to
incestuous abuse claims.209
 For example, in 1986 the Washington Supreme Court in
Tyson v. Tyson refused to apply the discovery rule to a twenty-six year old woman's claim
that her father sexually abused her during child hood ."° The Tyson court found that
expert psychological testimony is useless to substantiate the plaintiff's claim, reasoning
that when incestuous abuse claims are filed years after the abuse, they lack "objective,
verifiable evidence" and present insurmountable problems of proof.2" The court boldly
dismissed all previous judicial reliance on mental health expertise, a step that the United
States Supreme Court has explicitly refused to take. 212
 Rather than allowing the plaintiff
to attempt to persuade the fact-finder that her inability to discover her injury was
reasonable, the court decided that as a matter of law, her claim was forever barred.
The Tyson dissent correctly pointed out, however, that the plurality's decision effec-
tively bars any adult's claim that she was sexually abused as a child, because of the
symptoms' delayed emergence. 213
 Incest survivors present a typical symptomatic picture,
similar to "post-traumatic stress disorder. "214 Although it is very difficult to separate the
effects of incest from other noxious life events, a psychologist or psychiatrist can make
reasonably objective observations of various emotional characteristics and determine
whether the plaintiff's symptoms are more likely associated with incest than with some
other trauma. 213
 Although the incestuous abuse is not proved by showing this connection,
experts agree that it is suggested. 2 '° It should be left to the fact-finder to weigh all the
evidence and decide whether the sexual abuse did in fact occur, and whether that abuse
caused the recently discovered harm. Thus, according to the dissent, although the
"7 Id. at 1464, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 325,
"8
 Id. at 1469, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
20" See, e.g., Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986).
2I " Id. at 79-80, 727 P.2d at 230.
711
	 at 77-79, 727 P.2d at 229.
212 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896, 899 (1983), cited with approval in Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d
at 86-87, 727 P.2d at 233 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
The Tyson court relied heavily on a single law review article to conclude that the use of
psychotherapy to discover wrongful acts does not validate their occurrence. See Tyson, 107 Wash.
2d at 85-86, 727 P.2d at 233 (citing Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony,
60 WAsti. L. REV. 331 (1985)).
215 Id. at 89-90, 727 P.2d at 235 (l'earson, J., dissenting).
2 " See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text for a description of classic incest survivor
symptoms.
215 MEISELMAN, .supra note 2, at 195.
21° Id. at 196. The author analogizes the "proof" of incest in this situation to the "proof" that
cigarette smoking causes cancer. He rightfully asserts that "the high rate of lung cancer in heavy
smokers versus the low rate in non-smokers is not absolute proof of a causal relationship, but it
certainly suggests one." Id.
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discovery rule's application would not be automatic, neither would the statute of limi-
tations always bar plaintiff's claim. Although agreeing with the dissent's arguments, the
concurring judge argued that reading the discovery rule into the statute of limitations
for intentional torts amounts to improper judicial policy-making. 217
 The concurrence
accurately states the need for legislative action.
Courts also suspend statutes of limitation where the plaintiffs lack the capacity to
sue.m In these cases, the statutory period begins to run when the disability is removed. 219
If, for example, the victim was a minor or imprisoned at the time of the wrongful act,
the disabilities toll the statute of limitations until the victim attains the age of majority. 220
The plaintiff in John R. advanced a "localized impairment" theory, arguing that the
minor child's inability to reveal the abuse should toll the statutory period until he
regained his "competency. "221 In John R., the plaintiff argued that a teacher's sexual
assault of a fburteen year old student rendered the boy mentally incapacitated to the
extent that he could not disclose the incident to his parent. 222 The court rejected the
plaintiff's claim, holding that the only type of mental incapacity that tolls the statutory
period is one that renders an individual unable to attend diligently to daily activities
with the care expected of average persons. Under this standard, the minor in John R.
was not impaired, although the court delayed accrual of his cause of action on other
grounds. 225
Even if the courts interpreted mental incapacity broadly, the fact-finder would likely
find for the defendant on this issue. Although psychological research indicates that a
child's psychological development is seriously disrupted by incest, and similar traumatic
experiences,224
 it is difficult to declare incompetent the adult woman who apparently
functions normally in her everyday life. In addition, requiring the incest survivor to
brand herself "incompetent" in order to recover simply adds insult to injury. Thus, an
incest victim whose childhood abuse impairs her development is unable to toll the
limitations period because of incompetency.
Courts and legislatures apply the discovery rule in many situations where the plain-
tiff is blamelessly ignorant for the delay in discovering the wrong. 225 Furthermore, public
policy considerations justify applying the discovery rule where the defendant's intentional
acts cause the plaintiff's clelay. 22° Courts are reluctant, however, to apply the discovery
rule to torts such as incest, and incest survivors often have no meaningful tort remedies
217 Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 80, 727 P.2d at 230.
216 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text for a disctission of disabilities which toll the
statute of limitations.
219 See, e.g. CAI.. Civ. PROC. CODE § 352 (West Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 260 § 7
(McKinney Supp. 1987); N.Y. Cw. PIIAC. L. & R. 208 (Supp. 1988).
229 See, e.g. CAL.. QV. PROC. CODE	 352 (West Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. L. di. 260 § 7
(McKinney Supp. 1987); N.Y. Ctv. PRAC. L. & R. 208 (Supp. 1988).
221 194 Cal. App. 3d 1454, 1462-63, 240 Cal. Rpir. 319, 323-24 (1987).
222 See id.
229
	 John R. court delayed the cause of action's accural for a minor's sexual assault until the
parent reasonably discovered the injury, because the tort itself caused the child to conceal the
assault. Id. at 1466, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
224 SANFORD, supra note 60, at 165.
225 See supra notes 114-41 arid accompanying text for a discussion of the discovery rule's
application.
229 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 88, at 5.
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to vindicate their rights. 227 The law should become more responsive to incest claims. It
is theobligation of the state legislatures to act, by enacting laws which apply the discovery
rule to certain intentional torts, such as incestuous abuse, where the defendant's own
actions prevent a blamelessly ignorant victim from bringing a timely claim.
B. Legislative Recommendations
Su-Ong public policy and- fairness considerations disfavor barring an alleged incest
survivor's claim against her parent as a matter of law. 228 The incest survivor's injury is
often long-lasting yet slow to emerge. 229 Even as an adult, the victim often retains feelings
of shame and guilt and may blame herself for the childhood abuse. 280 Moreover, there
remain some residual effects of her father's admonitions not to tell, and a strong
reluctance to disclose her secret. 2 " 1 Denying the fact-finder the opportunity to determine
whether a survivor's delay in bringing suit was reasonable effectively denies most incest
victims any legal remedy for their injuries.
Unrestricted judicial application of the discovery rule, however, is not the answer.
Although it may seem more appropriate to apply the discovery rule when the defendant's
intentional acts cause the plaintiff's delay than where both parties may be equally
blameless," 2 the nature of a civil incest suit must be taken into account. The public views
a father charged with sexually molesting his child as a pariah, whether charged criminally
or in a civil action."" In the zealousness to combat the problem of childhood sexual
abuse, care must be taken not to relax procedural safeguards too far. It will not help
incest survivors as a class to ignore entirely statutes of limitation any time a plaintiff
claims to be too traumatized to bring suit within the statutory period. 2" If a large number
of unsubstantiated and meaningless claims are filed, society's eagerness to disbelieve a
problem as abhorrent as incest will make recovery even more difficult for the survivors, 285
The legislature, not the courts, therefore, must extend statutorily the discovery
rule's application to incestuous abuse claims. Civil incest laws must recognize the plain-
tiff's privacy rights and emotional health while maintaining the defendant's legal right
to be free from defending stale claims. Current statutory enactments are a step in the
right direction, but legislatures must enact more comprehensive laws than those that
currently exist.
227
	 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226. Cf. John R., No. A032560 at 14 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
24, 1987) (LEXIS, Allstates library, Omni File).
222 See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need for civil remedies
for incestuous abuse.
222 See supra notes 66-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of incest's negative conse-
quences.
252 See HERMAN, supra note I, at 97 ("[The incest survivors] felt that they had committed an
unpardonable sin which left them permanently stigmatized.").
2" See supra notes 59-65 anti accompanying text for a discussion of the incest victim's difficulties
with disclosure.
232
 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 88, at 5.
2" Brief for Defendant at 13, Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2c1 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986) (No.
51908-1).
234
	 id. at 3 (defendant did not relate this conclusion to the plight of incest survivors as a
class).
255 See generally Aesop, The Shepherd's Boy in AESOP, AESOP'S FABLES, 102-03 (Schoken ed. 1966)
(commonly known as "The Boy Who Cried Wolf").
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A civil incest statute must balance the plaintiff's harm in being denied a remedy
against the defendant's harm in defending a stale claim. The plaintiff's rights must be
protected by tolling the limitations period until she has discovered or reasonably should
have discovered the incest-related injury. The defendant's interests must be safeguarded
by applying a short statute of limitations once the cause of action accrues. Furthermore,
the defendant's protection must be ensured through an explicit definition of psycholog-
ical injury that is causally connected to childhood incestuous abuse. Before an individual
is found liable for incest-related psychological injury, the plaintiff must show that her
trauma was directly caused by the incest: This showing must he made through expert
psychological testimony. 2" Finally, such a legislative enactment serves the purpose of
extending the statute of limitations for the intentional tort of incest, while preventing
the undesirable encroachment of the discovery rule into the realm of intentional torts. 232
Thus, the legislature, not the judiciary, must apply the discovery rule to incest claims,
tolling the statute of limitations until a victim can reasonably discover her injury.
At present, California is the only state that has enacted legislation specifically ex-
tending the statute of limitations in civil actions for incestuous abuse. 23" Although the
California law recognizes that the unique circumstances of incest require a unique
response, it is neither precise enough nor sufficient. Although the law includes psycho-
logical illness within its definition of injury, it fails to define psychological injury and
does not require expert psychological testimony. 2" In addition, the California statute
does not preclude courts from applying a common law discovery rule to incestuous abuse
claims.240 To its credit, however, the California enactment precisely defines incestuous
abuse. 24 ' The law also understands that incest is relationally-based sexual abuse, and
includes close relatives and household members within its offender class. 242
In 1987, the Massachusetts legislature took steps to aid victims of sexual abuse by
proposing to extend the statute of limitations in both criminal and civil actions for
childhood sexual abuse. 24" Because the Massachusetts legislature was willing to extend
the statutory period for criminal cases, thereby subjecting the defendant to an increased
risk of severe punishment, the legislature probably will approve the proposal to extend
the statute for civil suits. 244 The Massachusetts House version of the bill extends the
statutory period to twenty years in all cases of childhood sexual abuse, not just incestuous
23" Expert psychological testimony necessarily plays a significant role in connecting the symp-
toms to the alleged abuse. Most mental health professionals are aware that distortions and fantasy
are possible. Moreover, if the therapist sees the survivor regularly, the therapist may judge the
veracity of the plaintiff's reports based on observations over a period of time. See generally MnisEt.-
MAN, supra note 2, at 196. In questionable cases of incest, brought many years after the abusive
relationship terminates, this type of clinical judgment is often the best available. See id. at 41.
2" See supra notes 106-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the discovery rule.
238 See CAL. C1V. PROC. CODE 340.1 (West Supp. 1988). See supra notes 180-83 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the California legislation.
23" M.	 340.1(b).
240 Id.* 340.1(d).
24 ' Id,	 340.1(a).
242 Id,* 340.1(c).
243 S. 722, 175 Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Mass.; H.R. 5745, 175 Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Mass.
219 The 1987 legislative session ended without either bill being signed into law. See supra notes
188-89 and infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Massachusetts criminal
statute.
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abuse cases. 245 The legislature should reject the House bill in favor of the Senate version,
which extends the statutory period to within ten years of the victim's eighteenth birthday
for incest claims only, and not for all childhood sexual abuse claims, because the rationale
behind a discovery rule for incest does not apply to all sexual assault cases. 240 The child
sexually injured by a stranger may feel guilt and shame, but not the betrayal of trust
and overwhelming fear of disclosure that the child who is subjected to an ongoing
relationship with her assailant must endure. Furthermore, a twenty-year limitation period
subjects the defendant to an excessive risk of stale claims, and does not encourage the
plaintiff to pursue her claim diligently. Thus, the Massachusetts legislature should adopt
the Senate's proposed ten-year statute of limitations period.
The Massachusetts legislature enacted a law in November 1987 that, although not
incest specific, extends the statute of limitations for prosecution of sexual crimes against
children from six to ten years. 242 The limitations period does not begin to run until the
child reaches the age of sixteen or reports the assault to a law enforcement agency,
whichever occurs first. 248 The Massachusetts criminal law strikes the appropriate balance
between the defendant's interests in repose and freedom from defending stale claims
against the victim's rights to redress and compensation for her injuries. Although some
valid actions probably will be barred for falling outside the ten-year period, this result
is justified because extending the statute of limitations beyond ten years tips the balance
too far in favor of the rights of the plaintiff, at the expense of the defendant.
Civil incest laws must recognize the incest victims' right to a remedy, while protecting
the legal interests of potential defendants. Current legislative enactments are a beginning,
but more comprehensive laws must be promulgated. To be effective and complete, a
civil incest statute must first define incest. 249 The law must then require the plaintiff to
connect causally the occurrence of childhood incestuous abuse to the later emergence
of her distress. 25° To address criticisms regarding the subjective and unprovable nature
of psychological injury, the statute should objectify the harm by requiring a mental
health professional to diagnose a characteristic pattern of incest-related symptoms."'
Finally, accrual of the cause of action must be delayed only until the plaintiff had
reasonable time to discover the injury and its relationship to the childhood abuse. 252 This
note proposes the following Model Statute based on these recommendations.
A Model Civil Incest Act2"
Action for injury or illness arising out of incestuous relationship; definitions.
(1) In any civil action for injury or illness based on sexual contact between a child
and an adult in a position of parental authority, where the alleged incestuous acts
245 H.R. 5745, 175 Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Mass.
246 See .supra notes 106-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the discovery rule.
247 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 277, 63 (amended Nov. 10, 1987).
249 Id.
249 See supra note 38 for a definition of incest.
250 See supra notes 79-88, and accompanying text for a discussion of the delayed emergence
of incest-related injuries.
251 See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the characteristic pattern
of symptoms.
252 See supra notes 985-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of a delayed accrual of
causes of action.
2" This proposed Model Civil Incest Act is patterned after California Civil Procedure Code
section 340.1 (West Supp. 1988), adopting the best parts of the California statute while remedying
its weaknesses.
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occurred before the child was 18 years of age, the cause of action will accrue at the time
of reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the incestuous acts.
Any such action shall be brought within one year after reasonable discovery, but no
more than ten years after the alleged incestuous acts occurred.
(2) "Incest" as used in this section shall be defined as any activity which sexually
stimulates a child or uses a child for the sexual stimulation of others.
(3) "Injury or illness" as used in this section includes psychological and/or physical
injury.
(a) For the purposes of application of this section, the allegation of psychological
illness or injury requires a diagnosis of a characteristic pattern of incest-related trauma,
for example post-traumatic stress syndrome, based on the criteria set Forth in the most
current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (at present,
volume III), as it may relate to sexual abuse or trauma.
(b) Psychological diagnosis shall be made by any qualified licensed psychiatrist or
psychologist.
(4) The question of whether the alleged incest survivor reasonably should have
discovered her/his injury and its causal relationship to the alleged incestuous abuse is a
matter of fact. The availability of mental health services in the survivor's locality and the
expense of such services are factors to be considered when assessing this reasonableness.
This proposed statute balances the competing interests of both the plaintiff and the
defendant in a civil action. It includes a simple, yet precise definition of incest. It requires
a causal connection to he drawn by a qualified mental health expert between the injury
and the emergence of specific, incest-related symptoms. Finally, the plaintiff must show
diligent pursuit of his or her claim, by filing the civil action within one year after discovery
of the harm. This statute considers the unique circumstances surrounding incestuous
abuse and applies an appropriate statute of limitations to ensure that the incest-survivor
has an effective civil remedy. Moreover, the statute meets the needs of incest victims,
while limiting the discovery rule's expansion.
CONCLUSION
Incest is a major problem in our society. Because criminal statutes proscribing incest
are not enforced adequately, penal sanctions are insufficient to protect fully the victim's
rights. Civil remedies are therefore necessary adjuncts to criminal laws to compensate
the victim for her injury. Unfortunately, procedural and substantive obstacles preclude
civil incest claims. Incestuous abuse often causes long-term emotional injury to the
survivor, with symptoms frequently not emerging until years after the sexual contact
terminates. Many blamelessly ignorant survivors, therefore, can not pursue civil claims
until the limitations period has expired.
Statutes of limitation constitute valuable procedural safeguards for defendants be-
cause they prevent plaintiffs from bringing civil actions many years after the event, when
memories have faded and claims are stale. Courts have created exceptions to the statutory
period, however, where equity demands it. Thus, in negligence actions, courts toll the
statute of limitations where the blamelessly ignorant plaintiff could not reasonably have
been aware of the injury. The "discovery rule" tolls the limitations period until the
plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the harm.
In intentional tort actions, in contrast, most courts refuse to toll the statute of
limitations. Courts reason that an intentional tort creates an immediate legal right to
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nominal damages without proof of harm, and thus the statutory period begins to run
from the date of the wrongful act, no matter when injury occurs. Because incest is an
intentional tort, most courts bar incest claims brought by adult survivors beyond the
statutory period. Some courts recognize, however, the unique circumstances surrounding
incestuous abuse. An abused child is under extreme familial and social pressure to remain
silent. Furthermore, the abused child frequently is blamelessly ignorant of the harm
until many years after the abuse ceases. Thus, the statute of limitations for incestuous
abuse must be extended.
The legislature, rather than the judiciary, must extend the discovery rule to inces-
tuous abuse claims because the discovery rule's expansion must not go unchecked. If
the judiciary were to apply the discovery rule to all intentional torts, the exceptions
would swallow the rule and statutes of limitation would become obsolete. Given the
balance between the strong public policy underlying limitations periods and an incest
survivor's unique situation, however, legislatures must act now to preserve and enhance
both the victim's rights and advance statutes of limitations underlying purpose. A statute
which limits the discovery rule's application to intentional torts to incest claims will serve
this purpose.
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